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Introduction 
There are few places in the world where people have changed the land so 
intensely and for such a long time as in China. Much of the country's habitated 
land had been transformed by human intervention already several hundred years 
ago. The Loess Plateau of northern China, for instance, was completely deforested 
in pre-industrial times (Fang / Xie, 1994).' During the early Han Dynasty, in the 
fourth and third century BC, the Chinese started systematic land reclamation and 
irrigation schemes, converting large areas of natural land into rice paddies. The 
process, which was scientifically planned and coordinated by subsequent dynastic 
bureaucracies, reached a first climax in the eleventh and twelfth c e n t ~ r y . ~  In the 
second half of the 18th and first half of the 19th century another period of massive 
land modification followed. 
1. Background 
1.2 Some Land-Cover 1 Land-Use Data 
Currently, China has a total land area of about 9.6 million km2. Some 15% is 
cultivated, about 20% is forest and woodland, and grassland covers some 35%. 
More than 22% of China's land area is covered by glaciers and permanent snow, 
sandy or stony desert (Gobi), and other marginal lands. In other words, far less 
than 80% of China's land is habitable. Cities, towns, industrial sites, rural settle- 
ments and infrastructure cover some 3.4% of the land area (and 4.3% of the 
habitable land) (see Table 1). 
1 Fang, J.W. / Xie, Z. (1994): Deforestation in pre-industrial China: The Loess Plateau as an example. In: 
Chemosphere, Vol. 29,983-999 
Braudel, F. (1990): Sozialgeschichte des 15.-18. Jahrhunderts. Der Alltag. Miinchen (Kindler Verlag), p. 159 
(Original Edition: Civilisation materielle, economic et capitalisme, XV.XVII1 siecle. Les structures du 
quotidien: Le Possible et l'impossible.) 
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Table 1: Land Cover / Land Use in China 
Source: Wu Chuangjun I Guo Huangcheng (1994): Land Use in China. Beijing, Science Press (in Chinese), p. 91 
According to a recently published book by Wu Chuangjun and Guo 
Huangcheng the largest change of land during the past four decades occurred in 
forestry land: since 1949 it was extended by more than 700,000 km2 (see Table 2). 
This information is somewhat surprising since most other sources have indicated 
a decline of China's forest and woodland (see also my comments at the end of the 
chapter). On the other hand, most experts agree that China's marginal land 
("other land") and grassland declined. Wu Chuangjun and Guo Huangcheng esti- 
mated the decline at almost 600,000 Ism2 and more than 500,000 km2, respectively 
(see Table 2). 
No: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The next largest change in human land-use was the expansion of settlement 
areas, mining sites and transportation infrastructure. According to Wu 
Chuangjun and Guo Huangcheng these areas increased by about 260,000 km2 
between 1949 and 1990 (see Table 2). Urban and industry-related land-use change 
is a major process in China. It is far more widespread than, for instance, the 
changes in the size of cultivated land which only slightly declined by less than 22 
square kilometers. This minor decline is also offset by the significant expansion of 
horticulture. They were extended by 63 km2 -- which is three times the size of the 
decline in cultivated land. Wu Chuangjun's and Guo Huangcheng's data also 
indicate a significant expansion of water bodies for ponds by 115 square kilome- 
ters (see Table 2). 
Total Land Area 
Cultivated Land 
Horticulture 
Forests / Woodland 
Grassland 
By far the largest proportional change of land use in China was the expansion of 
horticulture; since 1949 it increased by almost 60O0/0. This tremendous increase is 
mostly due to the small absolute size of the horticulture area in 1949. The area for 
settlements, mining and transportation increased by almost 390%. This was far 
more than the 56% increase of forest and woodland or the 51% expansion of 
inland water bodies (mainly ponds). The cultivated land area declined by about 
Area 
(in million km2) 
9.600 
1.364 
0.074 
1.954 
3.386 
Area 
(in % of Total 
Land Area) 
100.0% 
14.2% 
0.8% 
20.4% 
35.3% 
Area Area 
(in % of I (in % of 
70.6% 6 
"Usable" Land) 
0.2% 1.4% 
3.2% 17.2% 
0.9% 5.2% 
4.3% 23.8% 
"Agricultural" Land (Total: 2 - 5) 1 6.778 
Cultivated Land) 
100.0% - 
- 
100.0% 
7 Cities / Towns / Industry 0.019 0.2% 
8 Rural Settlements 0.235 2.4% 
9 Infrastructure 0.071 0.7% 
10 Non-Agricult, Land (Total: 7- 9) 0.324 3.4% 
- 
3.4% 
0.2% 
3.6% 
I 0.7% 
4.9% 
3.2% 
13.7% 
1 22.4% 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Inland Water Bodies / Fish Ponds * 0.325 Beaches 0.022 (Total: 11 - 12 0.347 
Glacier / Snow 0.069 
Sandy Desert 
Stone / Rock Desert (Gobi) 
Other (marginal) Land / Mountains 
(Total: 14 - 17) 
"Usable" Land (1 minus 18) 
0.467 
I 0.304 
-
1.31 2 
2.151 
7.449 
2% and the grassland shrank by some 14%. Other, mostly marginal, land declined 
by about 19%. 
Table 2: China's Land use Change 1949 - 1990 (in 1000 km2) 
Source: Wu Chuangjun I Guo Huangcheng (1994): Land Use in China. Beijing, Science Press (in Chinese), p. 77 
If Wu Chuangjun's and Guo Huangcheng's data are correct than we have to 
accept that urbanization and industrialization are the major driving forces of 
land-use change in China. Today, settlements, mining sites and infrastructures not 
only cover an area which is already about one third the size of China's cultivated 
land (see Table I), but they are also one of the most rapidly expanding types of 
land-use (see Table 2). 
The Central Statistical Office has also published some more recent land-use 
data by province. These data indicate a decline of cultivated areas in all Chinese 
provinces in 1993 -- most notably in Shanghai, Guangdong and Zhejiang (see 
Table 3). For instance, there was a steep 5.3% annual decline of cultivated land in 
Shanghai and a 4.3% decline in Guangdong. In 1993 the annual decline of culti- 
vated land in Guangdong, Xinjiang, and Shaanxi was approximately the same 
size as the total cultivated area of Tibet. 
Unfortunately, these statistical data on land-use change in China have several 
problems. While they are the best we currently could find, their validity is 
questionable and their level of detail is insufficient. They are highly aggregated 
on the national or province level and mainly focus on agricultural land-use. More 
specifically we have the following problems: 
There are gross inconsistencies between land-use statistics from various sources. 
In their recent book Wu Chuangjun and Guo Huangcheng published estimates 
for "cultivated land" which range from 1.364 (page 91) to 0.957 (page 77) 
million km2. China's Statistical Yearbook of 1994 reports a cultivated area of 
0.951 million km2for 1993 (page 329). In its AGROSTAT data base the FA0 has 
estimated China's "arable land & permanent crops" at 0.966 million square 
kilometers in 1991. The "arable land" alone was estimated to be only 0.933 
million krn2. Most experts believe that China has more than these 0.96 million 
km2under cultivation, but hard data are not available. 
Land-use statistics in China (as in many other parts of the world) are heavily 
biased towards the agricultural sector. While we can easily find most detailed 
statistical information on the cultivated areas by province in China's Statistical 
Yearbook (such as detailed crop area information reproduced in Table A1 in 
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Table 3: Recent Trends: Annual Change of Cultivated Area by Province, 1993 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1994. People's Republic of China 
--- 
Province 
Guangdong 
Shandong 
Hubei 
Shaanxi 
Sichuan 
Henan 
Zhejiang 
Jiangsu 
Anhui 
Hunan 
Liaoning 
Shanxi 
-- 
Jiangxi 
Hebei - 
Shanghai 
Fujian 
Guizhou 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hainan 
Tibet 
Jilin 
Gansu 
Ningxia 
Qinghai 
Guangxi 
Yunnan 
Xinjiang 
Heilongjiang 
Inner Mongolia 
Total 
the Appendix), almost no data are published on land areas used for settle- 
ments, industrial sites or infrastructure. This deficit of statistical information on 
urban and industrial land-use is critical, since these are the sectors where the 
land-use changes will be most dramatic. 
Finally, there is the problem that some of the most intense land-use changes in 
China have occurred very recently -- during the past two or three years. 
Currently available statistical time series, however, usually end in 1992 or 1993. 
There is reason to believe that especially areas used for urban and industrial 
purposes significantly expanded during the most recent third phase in China's 
economic transition which started in the early 1990s. 
These data problems are widely acknowledged in the literature. The United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization has shied away from publishing any 
land-use estimates for China in its recent study on "World Agriculture: Towards 
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Cultivated Area (in 1000 Ha) 
1 9 8 9 -  1993 
Change 
(in 1000 --Ha) 
1989 - 93 
-168.2 
-109.1 
-94.1 
-82.7 
-75.7 
-74.0 
-69.9 
-67.1 
-55.6 
-45.7 
-40.7 
-32.4 
-- -29.4 
-24.5 
-22.2 
-19.1 
-8.7 
-8.7 
-3.5 
-2.0 
1.3 
2.3 
--
3.5 
- 
8.1 
9.4 
28.1 
31.9 
2,524.7 
6,867.9 
3,486.6 
3,541.1 
6,307.2 
6,944.4 
1,731.1 
4,562.3 
4,373.0 
3,318.6 
3,470.4 
3,701.8 
-- 
2,355.5 
6,560.5 
324.0 
Annual 
Change 
(in 1000 Ha) 
in 1993 
-1 02.3 
-47.0 
-- -33.0 
-52.0 
-32.0 
-17.0 
-33.3 
-28.8 
-17.8 
-28.0 
-25.3 
-15.8 
-12.3 
-8.7 
-16.0 
- -1 1.2 
-10.4 
-3.0 
-1.1 
-7.9 
0.0 
-1 1.3 
-6.1 
-4.0 
-2.1 
-34.6 
-46.0 
2,356.5 
6,758.8 
3,392.5 
3,458.4 
6,231.5 
6,870.4 
1,661.2 
4,495.2 
4,317.4 
3,272.9 
3,429.7 
3,669.4 
2,326.1 
6,536.0 
301.8 
1,219.4 
-61.3 
-19.1 
-45.0 
-606.9 
3,072.9 
8,826.5 
4,911.5 
95,656.0 
- 3 , y  47.3 
8,913.2 86.7 
5,171.7 1 260.2 
95,101.5 1 -540.1 
:$:El - 1,845.3 
414.5, 405.8 
432.3 
433.5 
222.3 
3,935.5 
3,477.1 
795.0 
572.0 
2,578.5 
2,822.8 
428.8 
431.5 
223.6 
3,937.8 
3,480.6 -- 
803.1 
581.4 
2,606.6 1 
2,854.7 
2010". While there are several tables in this study dealing with the change of 
global land-use patterns by region between 1961 to 1991 (including projections to 
2010) all estimates and projections were made with the exclusion of China.3 
1.2 Land-use versus Land-cover Change 
Land use is an intentional human activity. People use land, because they want 
to extract "resources" (in the widest sense) from the land in order to satisfy their 
needs for food, water, habitation, energy, fiber, mobility, or recreation. Humans 
also use land for esthetic and spiritual reasons or political ambitions. Land use 
activities usually modify the land cover -- but sometimes people also reserve land 
for parks where they try to minimize human interference so that an almost 
"natural" land cover can remain or re-develop. No matter which type of land use 
we want to study, it is inevitable to focus the analysis on the human actions and inten- 
tions, because they are the factors which change the land cover. And we have to 
understand those demographic, economic, political, and social processes which 
explain human land-use intentions. To restrict a study of land use change to an 
inventory or bio-physical model of land cover changes would go about this 
problem the wrong way. It would focus the study on the results of the process 
instead on its causes. 
There is, of course, land cover in China which is changed by bio-chemical and 
bio-physical processes without significant and direct human intervention, such as 
land cover which is altered by seismic activities, hydrological processes, or 
climate change. Very large parts of China are sparsely populated and partly 
covered by (almost) natural vegetation. Direct human intervention in these areas 
is so minimal that we can probably analyze and model the vegetation cover in a 
purely bio-physical cause-and-effect framework. This, however, is not possible 
with China's densely habitated and cultivated Eastern provinces, where most of 
the land cover is a product of century-long human intervention. This land is not 
just afected but transformed by human action. 
It should also be noted, that even where we have (almost) natural land cover in 
China, human activities indirectly affect the bio-physical process through which it 
changes. The possible shift of vegetation belts, the migration of plant species or 
the land-cover effects of hydrological changes can be linked to global climate 
change, which is (at least partly) caused by human activities. 
2. Anthropogenic Factors of Land-use Change 
In the future, anthropogenic factors will have a great impact on China's land 
cover, because the land will be used by a population with massive (absolute) 
growth. The country also is in a process of rapid economic development which will 
shift the people's primary economic activity from agriculture to industrial pro- 
duction and services. This economic transformation has already triggered a 
process of population re-distribution and urbanization. Associated to both trends is a 
Alexandratos, N. (Ed.) (1995): World Agriculture: Towards 2010. An FA0 Study. Chichester et al. (FA0 and 
John Wiley & Sons) 
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change in lifestyles: the urban population, working in industries or service sectors, 
typically will have other food preferences, consumption and mobility patterns, 
and leisure activities than the peasants of today. To a great extent land use in 
China, however, will depend on the country's future political structures, insti- 
tutions and arrangements. 
This puzzle of interwoven demographic, social, economic and political driving 
forces of land use change makes it inevitable that we identify a small set of major 
elements in order to develop an analytical concept. This is the objective of the 
following discussion which is based on the assumption that we can only under- 
stand future land use change in China if we take into account five driving factors: 
1. The unprecedented and essentially unpreventable increase of population in 
modern China; 
2. the rural-urban migration and the emergence of urban agglomerates; 
3. an accelerating economic modernization and industrialization; 
4. changes in lifestyles among Chinese consumers, such as changes in food 
preferences, mobility patterns, and leisure activities, which are linked to the 
urbanization and industrialization of the country; and finally 
5. the land-use impact of changing economic and political arrangements and 
institutions (such as the emergence of land markets). 
2.1 The (unprecedented and essentially unpreventable) further 
increase of population in China 
Land use in China certainly cannot be analyzed, modeled, projected or planned 
without a deeper understanding of the country's demographic trends. Since 
people -- not bio-physical processes -- have transformed the habitated land, their 
number is a critical factor. There are two characteristics of the Chinese population 
we have to keep in mind when analyzing land-use changes: First, its enormous 
increase during the past four-and-a-half decades -- which is without historical 
precedence -- and, second, its extremely uneven spatial distribution. 
For more than 1400 years -- during the Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan and Ming 
dynasties -- the Chinese empires had an almost stable population which fluctu- 
ated between only 37 and 60 million. There were periods of growth, such as 
during the last half of the eleventh century (Song dynasty), but they were re- 
versed by subsequent population de~l ine.~ The first period of sustained population 
growth in China was recorded between 1749 and 1851, when the population more 
than doubled from about 177 to some 430 million. The increasing food demand 
made it necessary to expand the cropland by a factor of more than four and to 
improve irrigation. Also, new food crops and high yield rice varieties were intro- 
d ~ c e d . ~  This growth, however, was followed by a century of relative population 
stagnation due to the decline and collapse of the dynastic system, the Japanese 
invasion and the outbreak of civil war (see Figure 1). 
4 Ge Jianxiong (1993): An estimate of the population size of the Ming dynasty in early 17th century. Paper 
presented at the XXII nd IUSSP General Conference, Session 40, Montreal, Canada 
Banister, J. (1987): China's Changing Population. Stanford (Stanford University Press) 
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Figure 1: China's Population, AD 0 - 2050 
Source: (a) Mi Hong (1 992): The Quantitative Analysis about Evolution of Historical Population on Ming Dynasty in China. 
In: Population History of East Asia, No. 2. (Papers presented to the XXll nd IUSSP General Conference, Session 
40, August 28, 1993); (b) Durand, J.D. (1960): The Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2 - 1953. In: Population 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 209-256; (c) Statistical Yearbook, 1994. People's Republic of China; (d) United Nations 
Population Division (1 995): World Population Prospects, 1950 - 1990, the 1994 Revision. New York 
\late: Only the data points represent empirical (or projected) data; the lines between the points were added to facilitate 
visual inspection. The dotted lines do not represent the dynastic periods, but indicate during which dynasty the data 
were collected. 
From 17th to the first half of the 20th century China and Europe had remarkab- 
ly similar population size: in 1650 China had a population of about 89 million, 
while Europe's population was about 103 million."ree centuries later, in 1950, 
China and Europe, again, had almost the same population: 555 million people as 
compared to 549 million (see ). But then a significant diversity of trends occurred: 
While China's population more than doubled since 1950, Europe's population 
only moderately increased to 727 million. The really dramatic divergence, 
however, will emerge during the next few decades: By 2050 the Asian country 
will most likely have more than 1.6 billion habitants, while Europe's population 
size will stagnate at 678 million (see Figure 2).' Thus, within only one century, the 
population will most likely triple in China. There are even higher projections. Lutz 
and colleagues have estimated that in a "worst case" scenario China's population 
could increase to 1.93 billion by 2030.' The International Programmes Center of 
the US Bureau of the Census, on the other hand, has estimated China's population 
to increase to only 1.41 billion by 2050.' I cannot go into the details of the various 
projections, but I consider the UN projection of 1.61 billion (medium variant, 1994 
edition) the most plausible -- a projection which, by the way, seems to be accepted 
by most Chinese demographers.1° 
The second basic characteristic of China's demographic situation is the com- 
pression of its large population into the eastern part of the country -- especially its 
coastal zones (see Figure 3). Much of China's land is virtually uninhabited: the 
Gobi Desert, the steep slopes of the Himalayan and the vast dry grasslands of 
North-Central China. 5O0/0 of the Chinese population lives on only 13% of the 
country's land area; two thirds of the population are concentrated in just 20% of 
the land. On the other hand: 50% of the Chinese land mass is extremely sparsely 
populated -- with a density ranging between 2 people per km2 in Tibet to 19 
people per km2 in the Inner Mongolia. Only 3.6% of the Chinese population live in 
these huge areas (seeTable 4). The highly uneven population distribution of China 
not only reflects the concentration of arable land resources in the East, but also the 
transportation problems of a continental scale country. Chinese civilization 
spread along the coastal zones, using sea transport as a backbone of colonization 
(see Figure 3). 
6 Please note that from the 17th to the 19th century the population of Europe includes the western part of 
Russia. The 1950,1995 and 2050 popuation data are from the 1994 UN projection which includes all of the 
Russian Federation; plus Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Molodova, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Channel Islands, Faeroe Islands, Isle of Man, Albania, 
Bosnia & Croatia, Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, TFYR Macedonia, 
Yugoslavia, Andorra, Gibraltar, Holy See, San Marino, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Monaco. 
' United Nations (1995): World Population, 1950 - 2050.1994 Revision. UN Population Division, New York 
' Lutz, W. / Prinz, C. / Langgassner, J. (1994): The IIASA World Population Scenarios to 2030. In: Lutz, w. 
(Ed.): The Future Population of the World. What can we assume today. London (Earthscan). 
' Johnson, P.D. (1995): International Data Base. Washington. (International Programmes Center of the US 
Bureau of the Census) 
lo The State Science and Technology Commission, People's Republic of China is using the 1.6 billion popula- 
tion projection for 2050 in its assessments. See: State Science and Technology Commission, People's 
Republic of China(1995): Population, Resource and Environment in China. Special Issue of the China 
Science and Technology Newsletter, No. 49, July 20,1995 
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Figure 2: China's and Europe's Population, AD 1650, 1749, 1851, 1950, 1995, 2050 
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Source: As in figure 3; in addition: Braudel, F. (1990): Sozialgeschichte des 15.-18. Jahrhunderts. Der Alltag. Miinchen 
(Kindler Verlag), p. 159 (Original Edition: Civilisation materielle, economie et capitalisme, XV.XVIII siecle. Les 
structures du quotidien: Le Possible et I'impossible.) 
Note: In 1650, 1749, and 1851 Europe includes the western part of Russia. The UN population estimates and projections 
for 1950, 1995 and 2050 are based on the UN definition of Europe which includes all of the Russian Federation. 
The compression of China's large (rural) population into the Eastern provinces 
has resulted in a unique demo-ecological situation: If we compare Chinese pro- 
vinces with (industrialized) countries of similar population size, we can see that 
these Chinese provinces are typically twice or three times more densely popu- 
lated than typical industrialized countries (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Chinese Counties with a Population Density of 25, People per km2 and higher. 
- - 
Source: People's Republic of China, State Statistical Office, 1992 
Table 4: Land Area, Population and Population Density of China's provinces, 1993 
Source: People's Republic of China, State Statistical Office, 1994 
The Chinese province of Anhui, for instance, has the same population as Italy; 
its density, however, is more than twice that of Italy -- 420 as compared to 189 
people per km2. Spain has a population of 39 million, and so has the Chinese 
province of Liaoning; but Spain's population density is 78 people per km2 while it 
is 273 people per km2 in Liaoning. Inner Mongolia, arguably a very sparsely 
populated province of China, has a population comparable in size to that of 
Australia -- some 19 million as compared to 17 million. Population density in the 
Inner Mongolia, however, is almost 10 times higher than in Australia. The 
"densely" settled Germany had a population of about 80 million in 1990 -- some- 
what more than Guangdong (combined with Hainan) or Jiangsu, and a little less 
than Shandong. All these Chinese provinces, however, have a much higher popu- 
lation density, ranging from 343 in Guangdong + Hainan to 663 people per km2 
in Jiangsu. A last example: both Mexico and the Chinese province of Shandong 
have a population of some 85 million inhabitants; the Chinese province, however, 
has a density which is 13 times higher than that of Mexico. The high density of its 
very large (rural) population is a critical factor of China's future development. 
Province 
Shanghai 
Tianjin 
Jiangsu 
Beijing 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Henan 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Guangdong + Hainan 
Hebei 
Hunan 
Hubei 
Liaoning 
Fujian 
Sichuan 
Shanxi 
Guizhou 
Guangxi 
Shaanxi 
Jilin 
Yunnan 
Ningxia - 
Heilongjiang 
Gansu 
Inner Mongolia 
Xinjiang 
Qinghai 1 
Xizang (Tibet) 
Total 
Within the next five decades China has to provide food, labor, energy, resour- 
ces, housing to an additional 400 million people -- an increase of population, which 
Total 
Population 
1993 
(in million) 
12.9 
8.9 
68.0 
10.6 
98.6 
86.2 
89.1 
43.1 
58.7 
72.6 
63.1 
62.5 
55.9 
39.8 
31 .O 
110.0 
29.6 
33.3 
44.1 
33.7 
25.0 1 
38.0 
4.9 
35.4 
23.2 
22.0 
15.8 
4.5 
2.3 
1,222.8 
Total Area 
(in km2) 
6,186 
1 1,305 
102,600 
16,807 
166,600 
153,300 
1 67,000 
101,800 
139,900 
21 2,000 
187,700 
204,000 
185,900 
145,700 
123,100 
569,000 
156,300 
176,300 
236,200 
205,600 
187,400 
394,000 
60,000 
453,300 
454,000 
1,183,000 
1,646,800 
721,500 
1,228,400 
9,595,698 
Population 
Density 
(People 1 km2) 
2,093 
787 
663 
629 
592 
562 
534 
-
424 
420 
343 
336 
306 
301 
273 
252 
193 
189 
189 
187 
164 
133 
97 
82 
78 
5 1 
19 
10 
6 
2 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Land 
0.1 
0.2 
1.3 
1.4 
3.2 
4.8 
6.5 
7.6 
9.0' 
11.2 
13.2 
15.3 
17.2 
18.8 
20.0 
26.0 
27.6 
29.4 
31.9 
34.0 
36.0 
40.1 
40.7 
45.5 
50.2 
62.5 
79.7 
87.2 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Population 
1.1 
1.8 
7.3 
8.2 
16.3 
23.3 
30.6 
34.1 
38.9 
44.9 
50.0 
55.2 
59.7 
63.0 
65.5 
74.5 
76.9 
79.7 
83.3 
86.0 
88.1 
91.2 
91.6 
94.5 
96.4 
98.2 
99.4 
99.8 
100.0 
is more than twice the current total population of Western Europe (which in- 
cludes the combined total population of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Switzerland). And China has to deal with this 
massive population increase predominantly in the East of the country and its 
coastal zones which are already extremely densely populated and probably close 
to the carrying capacity of their arable land. 
Table 5: Population Density of Selected Chinese Provinces and Countries of Comparable 
Population Size 
Source: People's Republic of China, State Statistical Office, 1994; UN Population Assessments and Projections. 1994 
This task is without historic precedence; and there can be no doubt that it will 
affect land use in multiple ways: 
Selected Chinese Provinces 
The task of providing food for another 400 million people will undoubtedly 
change the land. The State Science and Technology Commission believes that 
by 2040 the production of food crops, pork, beef, and mutton must be doubled, 
as well as the production of soybean, sugar and vegetable oils. The production 
of aqua-cultures must be tripled." Since China has almost exhausted its arable 
land -- significant reserves of farmland can only be found in the Northeastern 
provinces of Lianoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang12 -- much of the increase in food 
production will have to come from agricultural intensification and moderniza- 
Jiangxi 98.6 
- 
562 Mexico 84.5 
--- 
43 
663 
336 
- 
Hunan 62.5 306 Iran 58.9 36 
Anhui 420 Italy 
301 France 
I 1871 
---- 
---- p - - p - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
424 
Liaoning 
-- 
273 Spain --- - 39.3 78 
Shaanxi 
--ppp- -
33.7 164 
Guizhou 33.3 189 
-- 
Fujian 31 .O 252 
--- 
Shanxi 29.6 189 Canada 27.8 3 
----- -
Inner Mongolia 22.0 19 Australia 2 
Tianjin 8.9 787 Sweden 8.6 19 
Ningxia 
-- 
4.9 82 Finland 5.0 15 
Qinghai 4.5 6 Norwa 4.2 13 
I 
Total I population 
1993 
Countries of comparable population size 
The State Science and Technology Commission, People's Republic of China (1995): Population, Resource 
and Environment in China. Special Issue of the China Science and Technology Newsletter, No. 49, July 20, 
1995 
12 Hook, B. / Twitchett, D. (1991): The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China. New York (Cambridge University 
Press) 
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tion. In addition, food imports will probably have to increase considerably. 
There is concern that international markets might be unable to supply future 
Chinese demand; but this is probably just a matter of price. If China can afford 
to pay higher prices, farmers in Canada and Northern America would probably 
be more than happy and capable of providing the additional amounts. How- 
ever, this is only possible if China's industrial exports will generate enough 
foreign currency to pay for the country's food imports. 
Second, 400 million people will need additional space for housing and urban 
infrastructures. The eastern part of the country however, is already densely 
populated and the rest -- which is covered by sand, rock surfaces, grasslands 
and mountain ranges with very little rainfall and/or extreme cold in the winter 
-- is not very attractive for human settlements. Rural counties in the habitated 
part of the country have population densities which are among the highest in 
the world. Additional space for housing and infrastructure can often only be 
taken from cultivated areas. 
Third, even without any improvement in living standards additional energy 
has to be provided for hundreds of millions of people. Assuming further eco- 
nomic growth Chinese researchers have estimated that the energy production 
has to be expanded by at least 3 to 5 times. Most of this energy will come from 
coal and (in rural areas) firewood, but there are also concrete plans to expand 
hydropower. Increasing firewood collection will put China's forests under 
additional stress and the construction of reservoirs will directly affect the land 
use in river valleys. Work on the "Three Gorges" project, a massive scheme to 
dam the Yankees river, was started only recently. 
In addition to these direct land-use consequences of population growth numer- 
ous indirect effects exist, which we will discuss below. The most important is a 
process of rural-urban migration and urbanization. 
China has long been the prototype of a rural society. The government's closed 
city policy effectively prevented rapid urbanization and 72% of the population is 
still classified as rural.'4 This will almost certainly change in the near future. 
Attracted by the rapidly growing industrial and commercial sectors in towns and 
urban areas and pushed by rural un(der)employment millions of Chinese 
peasants will go urban. According to Chinese sources the number of cities is pro- 
jected to almost double within the next 15 years (from currently 570 to about 
1000). 
l3  Parts of the "Urbanization" paragraph have been previously published in: Heilig, G.K. (1995): Lifestyles 
and Global Land-use Change: Data and Theses. Laxenburg (International lnstitute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Working Paper WP-95-91) and in: Heilig, G.K. (1995): Who is Changing the Land. Data and 
Concepts. In: Population and Environmental Issues. Rene Dubos Center (Ed.), New York (Greenwood 
Publishing Group) (in press) 
l4 State Statistical Bureau (1994): Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing, p. 33 
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Table 6: LIN Estimates and Projections: Population of the largest 51 Cities in China, 
1950,1995,2015 
- - -  - - - -  
Source: United Nations (1995): Urban Agglomerations, 1950-201 5. The 1994 Revision. Machine-readable Data Sets. UN 
Population Division, New York 
The United Nations Population Division is monitoring the population of 51 
Chinese cities and urban agglomerates.15 According to their estimates, which are 
based on Chinese reports, these cities had a total population of about 39 million in 
1950. Today, their population is almost 134 million. The UN recently projected 
that within only twenty years their combined population will further increase to 
about 220 million. China's 51 largest cities, in other words, will have twice the 
total population of Japan. Shanghai, for instance, is projected to increase to 23 mil- 
lion by 2015 -- mainly due to rural-urban migration; Beijing could be 19 million 
and Tianjin almost 17 million (see Table 6). 
Could this projection of urban growth in China be an exaggeration? I don't 
think so. In fact, the UN projections cited above are actually quite conservative, as 
compared to the actual historical trends. Between 1950 and 1995 China's largest 
city populations had an average annual growth rate of 2.8%. The UN projections 
imply that this growth will slow down to an annual growth rate of 2.0% between 
1995 and 2015. 
Figure 4: (a) Population of Selected Chinese Cities: 1950 - 2050 
(b) Urban and Rural Population in China: 1950 - 2050 
I 
ooo - -- + Belling 
-R- Wuhan 
12 000 -- 
Source: (a) United Nations (1 995): Urban Agglomerations, 1950-2015. The 1994 Revision. Machine-readable Data Sets. 
UN Population Division, New York. (b) United Nations (1995): Urban and Rural Areas, 1950-2025. The 1994 
Revision. Machine-readable Data Sets. UN Population Division, New York 
Are there any other obvious patterns of migration in China? A first attempt to 
answer this question is shown in Table 7. It is based on a county/city level data 
base of birth and death rates in 1993. These two rates can be used to calculate the 
"natural growth rate" of the population. We also have the "total annual growth 
rate" of the population. The difference between total and natural population 
l5  United Nations (1995): Urban Agglomerations, 1950-2015. The 1994 Revision. Machine-readable Data Sets. 
UN Population Division, New York 
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growth must be due to migration. Thus we can estimate the annual growth or de- 
cline due to net migration. 
Table 7: Counties and Cities with Highest Population Growth or Decline due to Migration 
(based on the differences between natural and actual population growth) 
Source: People's Republic of China (1993): Population by County and City. Beijing (Ministry of Public Security) 
Note: 'The "Estimated Annual Growth 1 Decline due to Net-Migration" was calculated as the difference between the 
reported "Total Population Growth Rate" (in %per year) and the "Natural Growth Rate" (which is the Birth Rate minus 
Death Rate divided by 10). Please note that birth and death rates by county might not be very reliable, so that the 
estimated net-migration should be considered only as a rough approximation. 
Estimated 
Annual Growth 
due to Net- 
Migration 
27.91 
15.14 
10.89 
9.94 
6.05 
5.95 
5.92 
5.55 
5.21 
5.10 
4.29 
4.24 
3.97 
3.96 
3.94 
3.84 
3.73 
3.68 
3.54 
3.30 
Counties I Cities with Highest In-Migration 
Natural 
Annual 
County I City Birth Rate Death Rate Growth Rate 
Shenzen City 12.51 0.95 1.16 
Baoan 12.47 1.88 1.06 
Zhuhai City 15.68 2.66 1.30 
Huolinguoli 18.16 2.42 1.57 
Daxian City 14.37 4.02 1.04 
Zhumadian City 17.16 3.88 1.33 
Mohe 18.28 2.66 1.56 
Shufu 39.31 7.94 3.14 
Huizhou City 17.50 5.10 1.24 
Qitaihe City 21.51 2.86 1.87 
Foshan City 13.81 4.38 0.94 
Yanji 16.1 1 5.24 1.09 
Erlianhaote 22.85 1.66 2.12 
Panjin City 14.56 2.56 1.20 
Tongshi 19.99 3.94 1.61 
Fuyuan 22.34 3.23 1.91 
Rangfan City 14.40 3.48 1.09 
Gujiao 25.48 3.52 2.20 
Shashi 15.33 4.53 1.08 
Tahe 16.74 3.16 1.36 
Counties I Cities with Highest Out-Migration 
Total Annual 
Population 
Growth Rate 
29.07 
16.20 
12.19 
11.51 
7.08 
7.28 
7.48 
8.69 
6.45 
6.96 
5.23 
5.33 
6.09 
5.16 
5.54 
5.75 
4.82 
5.88 
4.62 
4.66 
Estimated 
Annual Decline 
due to Net- 
Natural 
Annual 
Total Annual 
Population 
Birth Rate County I City Death Rate Growth Rate 
Hetian City 30.95 5.23 2.57 
Hetian County 37.83 7.85 3.00 
Jixian 17.24 4.28 1.30 
Kashi City 25.82 6.40 1.94 
Yongshun 36.94 9.27 2.77 
Fushun 25.70 8.10 1.76 
Yanqi 18.63 3.58 1.51 
Dulan 24.06 5.95 1.81 
Huanglong 23.68 5.83 1.79 
Gangcha 24.78 4.86 1.99 
Puyang County 27.97 5.56 2.24 
Jiaohe 19.17 6.13 1.30 
Qinggang 19.86 5.17 1.47 
Wangkui 18.61 5.10 1.35 
Baiquan 21.50 5.20 1.63 
Fuhai 26.08 4.03 2.21 
Bomi 27.31 7.92 1.94 
Hailun 18.72 5.13 1.36 
Queshan 20.06 6.52 1.35 
Bin 18.78 4.95 1.38 
Growth Rate 
-8.47 
-3.16 
-3.83 
-2.97 
-1.42 
-1.43 
-1.38 
-1.04 
-0.78 
-0.43 
-0.12 
-0.98 
-0.77 
-0.86 
-0.49 
0.16 
-0.06 
-0.64 
-0.62 
-0.58 
-11.04 
-6.16 
-5.13 
-4.91 
-4.19 
-3.19 
-2.89 
-2.85 
-2.57 
-2.42 
-2.36 
-2.28 
-2.24 
-2.21 
-2.12 
-2.05 
-2.00 
-2.00 
-1.97 
-1.96 
We have ranked more than 2000 Chinese counties and cities for which we have 
data according to their estimated population change due to net migration. The 
first part of Table 7 gives the 20 counties or cities with the highest population 
growth due to in-migration, the second part reports the counties/cities with the 
highest population decline. Using a map we can easily see that both types of 
counties and cities are distributed all over China. This seems to indicate that 
migration in China is probably governed by local or regional conditions. There 
seem to be cities or counties all over the country which attract farmers from 
surrounding areas. China apparently does not (yet) experience some kind of a 
long-distance "gold rush'' to the prosperous counties and cities in the East, but a 
more distributed process of urbanization. Clearly, this is just an impression from a 
very limited set of statistical data. More detailed investigation of migration sta- 
tistics is necessary (and planned) to confirm or reject this observation. 
The State Statistical Bureau (PRC) has estimated that the total urban population 
of China will increase from 28% (in 1995) to 50% in 2010.16 In its most recent 
assessment the United Nations Population Division has estimated a 1 billion urban 
population for China in 2050 -- two thirds of the total population. For comparison: 
In 1950 China's urban population was 61 million (see ).I7 Quite frankly-it is very 
hard to believe that this 940 million increase in city dwellers would not cause a 
major urban land-use expansion. 
The growth of China's cities and urban agglomerates, of course, depends on 
future political and economic conditions. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government 
had strictly regulated migration and basically closed the cities for rural-urban 
migrants. However, there are good (economic) reasons to believe, that even if 
China's government will try to maintain some restriction of mobility, massive 
rural-urban migration and city growth cannot be stopped. Beijing and Shanghai 
already have so-called "floating" populations of between 1 and 2 million each -- 
the Chinese version of "illegal" rural-urban migrants. There are powerful pull 
and push factors for -- if necessary, illegal -- rural-urban migration: 
First, there is a huge demand for cheap rural labor in China's cities and urban 
areas, due to the accelerating economic boom. Many construction companies 
already hire their unskilled workers directly in rural areas. In the booming 
towns and cities, there are also numerous opportunities for starting a small 
private business -- from selling self-made household items to running a food 
stall or street restaurant. Jobs and business opportunities, however, are not the 
only attractions of town and cities. As everywhere else in the world rural 
people realize that cities provide better facilities for education, health care, and 
entertainment than the villages. Only strict control of mobility has so far pre- 
vented the young and energetic from (at least temporary) migrating to the 
urban areas. Without these controls a tidal wave of farmers would check out 
the urban opportunities. 
Second, there is a large reservoir of (hidden) rural unemployment which will 
significantly increase in the next decades. We have already mentioned that 
16 State Statistical Bureau (1994): Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing, p.  33 
17 United Nations (1995): Urban and Rural Areas, 1950-2025. The 1994 Revision. Machine-readable Data Sets. 
UN Population Division, New York 
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between today and the year 2050 the country population will grow by about 
400 million -- most of it will be born in rural areas. It is very unlikely that these 
additional people can be absorbed in the agricultural sector. There is already 
hidden unemployment and the mechanization and modernization of agricul- 
ture will further reduce labor demand. Since 1978 China's farmers have in- 
creased agricultural machinery by a factor of 10; nitrogen fertilizer input grew 
even twelve-fold. Labor intensity in the agricultural sector will probably stag- 
nate or even decline, as China moves further towards modern agricultural pro- 
duction methods. Population growth and stagnating agricultural labor demand 
will cause a multi-million rural excess population. According to official Chinese 
estimates the country may have some 100 million idle farmers.'' Other Chinese 
experts believe that the surplus of rural labor is more in the range of 150 
million and could increase to 190 million by the end of 2000.19 
Direct effects of urbanization on land-use patterns 
The growth of cities and towns usually leads to a conversion of arable land into 
built-up areas for housing and commercial purposes. It can also cause a modifica- 
tion of built-up land without expansion of the area ("vertical growth" of high-rise 
buildings). In both cases the conversion of land is significant -- if not in size, then 
certainly in its temporal dimension. While agricultural land-use changes often 
affect large areas, they are usually reversible (even deforestation can be reversed 
by a reforestation program). The transformation of arable land into built-up areas, 
such as highways or settlements, however, is often not reversible (or only with 
extremely high costs). 
Table 8: Structure o f  Lost Cultivated Land in China: 1988 and 1989 
Source: World Bank (1993): China. Urban Land Management in an Emerging Market Economy. Washington, DC. p. 95 
18 Li Huirning (1994): Rural Workers Tiding in Urban Areas. Special Report 1.14. In: China Development 
Report, 1994. People's Republic of China (China Statistical Publishing House), p.168-169 
State Construction 
City, towns, factories, railway, 
highway, hydroelectic projects, other. 
Collective Construction 
Roads, irrigation, TVEs, farmer 
housing, other 
Agricultural Restructuring 
For fruit trees, forests, grassland, 
fishponds. 
Natural Disaster Related 
Total Loss of Cultivated Land 
Zhenghua, Jiang / Feldman, M.W. / Zhang, Lingguang (1995): Population and Development in China. 
Paper presented at the 1995 Summer Session of the Aspen Global Change InstiIute. 
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1989 1988 
(in 1000 ha) 
51.2 
22.7 
231.1 
97 
(in 1000 ha) 
71.2 
29 
394.8 
159.4 
676.3 
(in %) 
12.3 
5.4 
' 55.4 
23.2 
(in %) 
10.5 
4.3 
58.4 
23.6 
100 417.31 100, 
In 1988/89 China lost more than 1 million hectares of its cultivated land. Most 
of it was due to agricultural restructuring (about 55%) and natural disasters (some 
23%); but some 18 percent of the losses were due to urban growth and infrastruc- 
ture construction (see Table 8). This was seven years ago, when the current infra- 
structure boom had barely started. More recent statistics are not available to me, 
but the losses of cultivated land due to urban and infrastructure expansion must 
have multiplied. 
Of course, not all land in urban areas is sealed off by houses or roads. There is 
often a high proportion of land which looks rather "natural", such as parks, 
gardens, or vegetation belts between highway lanes. People are often surprised, 
how "green" and "untouched" the land appears from an a i r p l a n ~ v e n  within 
(or close to) urban agglomerates. This, of course, is a misleading impression. It is 
not the appearance of land, but the purpose of its use, which determines how it has 
to be classified. The purpose of agricultural land is the production of food and 
other agricultural products, it serves the rural population as a source of food and 
income. Urban land, on the other hand, no matter how "green" it appears, pro- 
vides space for housing, consumption, mobility, recreation, education or enter- 
tainment to people who earn their income in non-agricultural sectors (even if they 
grow some tomatoes in their cottage garden). 
Indirect effects of urbanization on land-use patterns 
Urbanization not only causes an expansion of built-up areas -- which is certainly 
only a minor change in terms of the size of land affected -- but has also far-reaching 
effects on indirect land-use change. City dwellers need a much broader supply and 
service infrastructure than rural populations-from shopping centers to water 
reservoirs. They usually cannot build their houses with local products, such as 
clay or wood -- steel mills and cement factories are necessary for urban construc- 
tion. They cannot collect firewood for cooking and heating, but depend on the 
production and distribution of commercial energy. The high per capita consumption 
of energy and material in urban areas affects the urban hinterland in many ways. 
Cities also need special areas for sewage treatment and waste disposal-in a 
village this is often done by reserving a certain spot behind the house. This is why 
a process of urbanization usually triggers off the growth of specific commercial 
sectors, supply infrastructures and city-specific land-use forms (such as parks, 
recreation areas, sport stadions, etc.). In addition, city people prefer processed 
food. They do not grow and mill wheat to bake their bread, but leave this job to 
farmers, mills and bakery shops. A large city population is the major factor for the 
emergence of commercial farming and food processing. This urban demand can 
change agricultural land-use in areas far away from the city. 
2.3 Economic modernization, accelerating industrialization, and 
resource exploitation 
The economic reforms of 1978 were probably more important to China's future 
land-use change than any other single event in recent history. A decade after the 
trauma of a Cultural Revolution and two years after Mao's death, China's leaders 
decided to gradually abandon the system of collective land ownership and centra- 
lized command economy. Family farming was re-introduced together with a 
limited system of agricultural markets. The impact couldn't have been greater. 
Almost instantly agricultural output began to increase. Within only 10 years 
China's peasants almost doubled the production of rice. But the growth was not 
only in volume -- the decentralized planning favored diversification and farmers 
began to concentrate on products where they had a comparative advantage. 
Before the liberalization the central planners had often forced them to grow rice 
where it would have been better to grow wheat, or to keep pigs where they 
should have been raising cattle. The new flexibility broadened the range of agri- 
cultural production to non-rice crops, aqua cultures, and various livestock. Meat 
consumption in China -- an extremely rare food in the 1950s and 1960s -- began to 
soar. Available statistics clearly indicate the new diversity of agricultural produc- 
tion after 1978 (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Indices of Per Capita Output (in kg) of Major Agricultural Products, 
1952 - 1993, (1952 = 100) 
- - - 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1994 (Beijing, People's Republic of China), p.31 
The growth of agricultural production in China from 1978 to the mid 1980s was 
far more rapid than most observers believed possible (see Figure 5). It was driven 
-- as Barnett noted -- by the "deep-rooted entrepreneurial impulses among 
China's peasants that long have been suppre~sed".~~ The explosion in agricultural 
productivity eliminated the biggest risk for the Chinese peasants: famine. Less 
than a generation after at least 23 million people had died in the famine of the 
20 Barnett, A.D. (1986): China's Modernization: Development and Reform in the 1980s. In: Joint Economic 
Committee of the Congress: China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000. Volume 1. Washington, D.C. 
(US. Government Printing Office), p.7-8 
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"Great Leap Forward", the farmers could not only feed their children, but actually 
expand their diets to meat, fish, sugar and fruits. More than that -- for the first 
time farmers could generate enoughmoney to buy consumer goods like bicycles, 
TV-sets, and watches. National income statistics clearly show the trigger effect of 
these 1978 reforms. 
Figure 6: National Income by Sector, 1952 - 1993 (in 100 million yuan) 
-- - - - - -  - 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1993, 1994 (Beijing, People's Republic of China), p.33 
Note: The figure is based on current prices. Due to inflation this leads to an overestimation of the national income. The 
key issue, however, is not the absolute level of real national income, but the temporal pattern of change. Since 
inflation has not changed dramatically in China, the figure indicates that the spectacular economic development 
in agriculture and industry only started in 1978. 
The talent for business showed up with even greater clarity as the first wave of 
economic modernization in China began to level off in the mid 1980s (see Figure 
7). Fortunately, a second wave of economic reform was ready to take off. In 1978 
Deng Xiaoping not only had returned the farmland to the peasants, but with 
remarkable foresight had introduced small-scale rural industries. These village 
and township enterprises became a phenomenal success. Their number increased 
more than twelve-fold from 1.5 in 1978 to 19 million in 1991, at which time they 
generated about 30 percent of China's Gross National Product -- exceeding the 
share of agricultural output.21 In the early-1990s Deng Xiaoping further encour- 
aged the peasants' engagement in the "xiangshen qiye" as the countryside enter- 
prises are called in China. Within only two years, from 1991 to 1993, their number 
further increased from 19 to almost 25 million.22 
21 Kristof, N.D. / W u d m ,  S. (1994): China Wakes. The struggle for the soul of a rising power. New York 
(Vintage), p.172 
- - 
22 Statistical Yearbook, 1994. People's Republic of China. p. 361 
Figure 7: (a) Three Phases of Economic Modernization: lndices of Total and Per Capita 
National Income, 1978 - 1993 (1 978 = 100) 
(b) lndices of National Income generated by Agriculture, Industry, Construction, 
Transportation, and Commerce, 1978 - 1993 (1 978 = 100) 
4- Transportation 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1993, 1994 (Beijing, People's Republic of China), p.33 
Note: Figure is based on current prices. 
With this clever move Deng succeeded to solve three fundamental problems of 
any developing economy: he reduced the power of the central bureaucracy, 
stopped the farmers from migrating to the big industries and the cities and gave 
them an opportunity to learn about modem technology and business. Contrary to 
the state-run heavy industry the town and village enterprises are owned by the 
local governments; their management is far more independent from national plans 
and regulations -- partly because they employ only from a few dozen to a few 
hundred people. The decentralized planning facilitated innovation. While most 
enterprises started with the production of crude consumer goods for the regional 
demand, some of them quickly switched to more profitable products for urban 
and international consumers. Today these rural industries put out many of the 
teddy bears, jigsaw puzzles, and plastic toys which populate the shelves of US toy 
warehouses. Some of the rural enterprises are heavy polluters of agricultural land 
and most are still far from western standards of efficiency, but they have helped 
to absorb agricultural excess population -- which is estimated from between 100 to 
200 million. The greatest potential benefit of the rural enterprises, however, is that 
they generate a broad base of managers and skilled laborers who are familiar with 
market mechanisms, understand technology and have learned the discipline of 
the assembly line. 
This broad base of trained human resources will be needed in the third phase of 
economic modernization in China which started in the early 1990s and is in full 
swing today. It is characterized by a massive growth of the industrial, transporta- 
tion and construction sectors (see Figure). China's leaders have realized that a 
fundamental modernization of the infrastructure is essential to make the country the 
third largest economy in the world. An enormous amount of capital is currently 
being invested into the construction of urban housing and business buildings, 
roads and railways, power plants and networks. 
Figure 8: (a) Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1978 - 1993 (in 100 million yuan) 
(b) Gross Domestic Product generated in Construction, Transportation etc. and 
Commerce, 1978 - 1993, (in million yuan) 
+Transportation, Post and 
Telecommunication Services 
............... 
..................... 
- 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1993, 1994 (Beijing, People's Republic of China), p.33 
Note: Figure is based on current prices. 
The geographical focus of China's economic modernization is easy to detect: 
the highest growth rates, by far, are reported from the coastal provinces of 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Lianoing, and Shanghai, where in 1993 the GDP 
was up to 87 times higher than in the Western part of the country (see Figure 9). 
In fact, the Gross Domestic Product of Guangdong in 1993 was equivalent to the 
total GDP of Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia and 
Heilongjiang provinces combined. In other words, on 2.23% of China's total land 
area the province of Guangdong generates the same GDP as the seven other 
provinces mentioned above, which cover almost 63% of the country's land area. 
This indicates an extreme spatial concentration of economic activity in China. 
Figure 9: (a) Gross Domestic Product by Province, 1990 - 1993 (in 100 million yuan) 
(b) Gross Domestic Product by Province in Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary 
Industry, 1990 - 1993, (in 100 million yuan) 
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While western scholars still dream of a country where transportation problems 
should be solved (for the sake of global carbon dioxide mitigation) by a mixture of 
bicycles and public transport facilities, China's economic planners have already 
decided that road transport will be a backbone of the country's economy. And 
private car ownership will be the growth engine for these ambitious plans. In late 
1994, He Guangyuan, China's minister of industry, announced that "to increase 
car sales the state will introduce incentives to car buyers to boost market 
demand".23 And in the summer of 1995 the Chinese government declared that the 
automotive sector will be the "pillar industry" of the economy. In the meantime 
the Chinese automobile industry, which was fragmented into some 125 state-run 
car manufactures, is in a process of consolidation. Before long it will be trans- 
23 China to Subsidize Car Purchases. International Herald Tribune, Sept. 23,1994. 
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formed into three or four gigantic producers which will emerge from joint 
ventures with Germany's Volkswagen AG (in Shanghai and Changchun), PSA 
Peugeot Citroen from France (in Wuhan), Japan's Daihatsu Motor Co. (in Tianjin) 
and others.24 Within the next five years they are expected to double annual car 
production from today's 1.5 to 3 million in the year 2000. By 2010 they should 
produce at least 4 million cars a year. 
How will these economic trends affect the use of land in China? Three major 
trends can be anticipated: 
Facilities for energy generation (water reservoirs), transportation infrastruc- 
tures and commercial buildings will eat up valuable cropland in China. High- 
ways, such as the six-lane superhighway recently built from Guangshou to 
Shenshen, will be cut through former rice paddies to connect the industrial and 
urban centers in China's Eastern provinces. Between 1980 and 1993 the area of 
paved roads in urban areas quadrupled from 252 to 1075 kmz. Gigantic dams 
are built or planned to meet the growing demand for electricity, such as the 
"Three Gorges Dam" which will drown 113,000 acres of fertile land.25 And all 
large cities in China will expand their perimeter due to an uncurbed construc- 
tion boom. But there are land-use effects which will go far beyond. 
The car industry (which, by the way, was also the growth engine of Germany's 
"economic miracle" in the 1950s and 60s) will not only boost China's economy, 
but will also transform its economic structure. Private trucks will stimulate eco- 
nomic flexibility and expand markets. What a car or a truck means to an entre- 
preneur can easily be seen from Beijing's taxi drivers. Those who managed to 
get a car of their own have not only often become Yuan-millionaires -- they 
have also significantly changed the commercial and private transportation and 
collaboration patterns in the city. It is no longer bicycles which cause the usual 
traffic congestion. Commercial road transport will accelerate the transition 
from an agricultural to an industrial and service economy. Small-scale pro- 
ducers and service enterprises will be able to reach distant markets and con- 
sumers. 
The car will also -- as everywhere else in the world -- change everyday life in 
China. With a "people's car" (the Chinese actually use the same term as the 
most popular German automobile "Volkswagen") individual mobilityz6 will 
explode. A growing number of citizens will experience the "freedom of the 
road" which can only be truly appreciated by those who were -- as the Chinese 
people -- controlled and restricted all their life. The experience of free indi- 
vidual mobility will change people's lifestyle -- in much the same way as it has 
transformed Western societies. Many of these new lifestyles which we will 
discuss below, are highly land-use related. 
24 "Mercedes-Benz Seals $1 Billion China Deal. Chrysler and Ford Are Beaten Out For Joint Venture to Build 
Minivans". In: International Herald Tribune, July 13,1995, p. 1: "China to Churn out Personal Cars. Can Its 
Infrastructure and Ecology Stand the Weight?" International Harald Tribune, Sept. 23,1994. 
25 Topping, A.R. (1995): Ecological Roulette: Damming the Yangtze. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5, 132- 
146 
26 The term "individual" in this context should not mean "one person", but rather "one family". It is, 
however, the opposite of "collective" which is still a dominating principle of social organization in China. 
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The rapid industrialization of China, which generated spectacular economic 
growth rates for more than a decade will significantly transform the country's 
land use patterns. Economic experts have argued that the urban parts of the 
Yangzi delta which are the centers of China's economic growth will become one 
big metropolitan sprawl like the one along America's east coast, from Boston, 
through New York, to Wa~hington.'~ 
2.4 Changes in Lifestyles 
Food Preferences 
Diets and food preferences can have a great impact on agriculture. It certainly 
makes a big difference in terms of land-use and -- by the way -- input energy 
efficiency whether 2000 kcal are consumed as a T-bone steak, a bunch of candy 
bars, or a bowl of rice. Unfortunately, it is not easy to predict trends in food 
preferences -- especially for a country like China. Much depends on the future 
level of income available for food -- a parameter very difficult to project. But there 
are also cultural factors, that have to be taken into account. Food consumption 
isn't just the supply of carbohydrates, protein, fat, vitamins, and fiber. As we 
know from the French, it is a way of life. Chinese cuisine may resist western 
dietary trends. 
Figure 10: Per Capita Meat Production in China (in kg) 
Source: FA0  (1994): AGROSTAT. Rome (Electronic Data Base) 
On the other hand we know that urban populations usually prefer different 
kinds of food than peasants. An increase in the proportion of urban population 
will thus automatically change China's overall composition of food demand. We 
27 The Economist, Sept. 9,1995, p. 63 
also have time-series data which indicate that a change in food preferences 
already occurred in China during the last decades. These trends can be extrapo- 
lated. Cross-country comparison is another possibility to determine future trends 
of food preferences in China. Other Asian countries, such as Japan or South Korea 
have experienced a change in dietary preferences during the last decades which 
could be seen as a prototype to model the Chinese transition. And finally, there is 
reason to believe that Western influence on Chinese food preferences may be 
more rapid and profound than expected. For the moment, the following trends 
seem to be most relevant for detailed research: 
China's meat consumption significantly increased during the past 30 years. Per 
capita production of animals slaughtered, for instance, grew from about 4 kg per 
year in 1961 to almost 30 kg per year in 1992 (see Figure 10). The increase of meat 
consumption in China was mainly due to the consumption of pig meat (see Figure 
10). Mutton, veal and beef are not very popular in China. 
It is quite likely that the consumption of animal-based food (meat, dairy pro- 
ducts, eggs) will further increase in China. Other Asian countries, such as Japan 
already have a much higher consumption of animal-based food (see Table 9). The 
most "Western" dietary pattern is probably represented by the United Sates. It 
could be considered an upper limit for the consumption of meat and dairy pro- 
ducts. 
What would be the land-use consequences of an accelerated trend towards 
animal based food in China? A further increase of pig meat consumption would 
probably boost the demand for feed crops, such as soybeans. In fact, the Chinese 
soybean areas increased significantly during the last few years. While soybean has 
its origin in China and was already cultivated there some 2800 years B.C.," not 
much of it was grown before the late 1980s. The 1994 Statistical Yearbook begins 
to report production areas for soybeans in the year 1992 with 8 million ha. By 1993 
the total sown area of soybeans had increased to over 12 million ha. This is 
equivalent in size to the combined areas for the production of vegetables, tobacco, 
sugar, and tea (!). In Heilongjiang one third of all cropland is already used for the 
cultivation of soybeans; in provinces with large extent of arable land, such as 
Henan or Sichuan, the soybean cultivation has increased to between 4% to 6% of 
the cropland area (see table A1 in the Appendix). A further trend towards meat- 
rich diets in China would also trigger a corresponding (per capita) decline in areas 
for cereal and roots and tubers production. 
Parts of China's grasslands might be suitable for ranging additional cattle. Beef 
is not unknown to the Chinese cuisine so it might be reasonable to consider the 
vast grasslands as one of the underutilized resources for the production of food. 
The main problem, however, is water. Large numbers of cattle would require the 
drilling of wells in these dry areas. Even if there is enough water underground, 
massive ecological problems, which we know from the African Sahel, could 
follow. It seems to be more reasonable to think about an expansion of pastoral 
systems based on animals better adapted to draught, such as camels, mules, sheep 
and goats." Obviously, any expansion of pastoral systems in China has to take 
28 Cheng Chunshu (Ed.) (1993): Climate and Agriculture in China. Beijing, China Meteorological Press, p.179 
29 Cheng Peilieu (1984): Livestock breeds of China. Rome (FA0 Animal Production and Health Paper, 46) 
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into account the close relationship between the productivity of livestock and their 
ecological conditions. Pastoral systems can only increase their production when 
they are adapted to the climatic conditions (temperature), the topography, the 
availability of water, and the kind of vegetation and topsoil of the specific grass- 
land area. 
Table 9: Patterns of Food Consumption in the USA, Europe, the former USSR, Japan 
and China: Average Calorie Consumption per Capita per Day, 1990 
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During the last 30 years worldwide sugar consumption multiplied, as the 
availability of soft drinks (Coca Cola) and manufactured candy bars expanded to 
almost every part of the world. Industrially manufactured soft drinks and the 
enormous range of "sweet "products produced from cocoa and sugar were 
extremely rare only 50 years ago. Today their marketing has expanded to even 
the most remote village on earth. There is a high probability -- if economic and 
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political conditions allow for it -- that in a few years young Chinese will also 
drink Coca Cola (or Pepsi), have a Hamburger and enjoy a milkshake or ice-cream 
(full of sugar). There is no reason why the expansion of some 14,000 McDonald's 
restaurants should stop at the Chinese boarder (when one can find them easily in 
Guatemala City, Moscow or Jakarta). If only a fraction of the 1.6 billion projected 
Chinese consumers in 2050 will begin to prefer such a "western" diet, it will have 
a significant impact on the (worldwide) sugar (and meat) demand. 
Figure 1 1 : Changes of Food Consumption Patterns in China: Average Calorie Con- 
sumption per Capita per Day, 1961 -1 990 
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Note: Cereals (mainly rice and wheat) account for between 63% and 69% of the average Chinese calorie supply. Changes 
in the proportion of other food commodities are much smaller. To make these visible we have rescaled the y- 
axis. Please note that it starts at 60%. 
Experience from Northern America and Europe suggests that there will not 
only be a trend towards animal-based food in China, but also a trend for 
increased vegetable oil consumption (see Table 9). As people prefer more meat, 
they often switch from animal fat to vegetable oil in order to avoid over-con- 
sumption of cholesterol. Recently, the Chinese government set up a commission 
to study how over-consumption of pig-meat could be stopped in order to prevent 
cholesterol-related diseases. 
Other land-use related lifestyle changes 
There are many lifestyles which directly or indirectly affect land-use patterns. 
Most of these lifestyles are related to the level of wealth in a society. As people 
become more affluent they usually prefer larger flats or move to suburban houses 
with gardens. This certainly affects land-use patterns, as one can easily observe in 
the sub-urban sprawl of Southern California and many other highly developed 
places. Of course, there is a long way (of economic growth) before Chinese cities 
might expand into space-consuming suburbs. But even a very modest increase in 
the demand of improved housing, and the most likely split-up of the large multi- 
generation Chinese households into core-family households, will boost land 
demand for (urban) housing. 
Even if some scientists believe otherwise, further economic growth in China 
will probably require a massive expansion of the private transportation sector.30 
There can be no doubt that this expansion of transportation infrastructure is well 
on its way. Between 1980 and 1993 total fright traffic in China more than tripled, 
from 9.8 to 30.5 billion t krn2. The area of paved roads increased by 326%; the per 
capita area of paved roads more than doubled (see Table 10). The modernization 
and commercialization of agriculture and the further expansion of industry just 
need a much larger transportation capacity than traditional (subsistence) farming 
or small-scale industries. Farmers have to supply distant markets within (and 
possibly also outside) the country. They need inputs (fertilizer, pesticides) which 
are produced in industrial areas and must be transported into the rural areas. 
Export-oriented industrial production which is rapidly expanding in China 
obviously has a much higher transportation volume than traditional small-scale 
industries which supplied local markets. 
China's economic growth also generates income which will eventually make 
motor bikes and cars affordable to private owners. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia 
already had their "Honda-Revolution" as can be easily observed in the traffic 
jams of Bangkok, Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur. The explosion of mobility is typical for 
all industrial societies around the globe. Why should China be an exception? 
It is very difficult to estimate the direct and -- even more important -- indirect 
impact of increasing mobility on land-use patterns. Transportation infrastructures 
(roads, railways, airports) will expand; more space will be needed for the 
servicing and supply infrastructure (car factories, service stations, etc.). But this 
direct impact on land-use will be minor compared to the indirect effects of in- 
creasing mobility, such as tourism, commuting, short-term migration flows, etc. 
30 The lack of transportation infrastructure in various African countries South of the Sahara is a major cause 
of its economic development disaster. 
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Table 10: Selected Consumption and Lifestyle-related Statistics 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1994 (Beijing. People's Republic of China), p. 20-23 
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Recently, China has reduced the number of working days per weel< from six to 
five. This immediately sparked a small-scale vacation boom. Public parks and 
beaches are now crowded on the "long weekends" -- a first step toward domestic 
tourism. Recreational land use might be still minimal in China, but with an in- 
crease of wealth this will change. Official statistics already indicate a more than 
three-fold increase in the per capita size of "public green areas" since 1980 (see 
Table 10). 
Total passenger traffic in China has increased tremendously from 1.7 billion 
person km2 in 1978 to 7.9 billion person krn2 in 1993 (see Table 10). It is not com- 
pletely impossible that sometime in the future a few hundred million Chinese will 
use their cars to visit friends and family members during the "Spring Festival" or 
go on vacation (something the present generation not even dreams of). What this 
will do to China's land can be observed in the most densely populated countries 
of Europe, where the remaining "natural" land is sliced by roads and highways 
and where coastal areas are covered by the semi-urban sprawl of tourist centers 
(such as the "Costa del Sol"). 
In 1995 almost five million foreigners visited China -- expatriate Chinese not 
counted. This invasion of foreigners will inevitably change attitudes and life- 
styles. One can already observe western-style weddings, beauty contests, 
gambling halls, cellular phones, busy MacDonaldls restaurants, numerous luxury 
limousines, and Coca Cola drinkers everywhere. 
2.5 Future Political and Economic Conditions 
Future land-use in China, of course, heavily depends on how the country's 
leaders will pursue reform. But what does the future hold for China?3' Will the 
country experience political and economic stability?32 Will its provinces and spe- 
cial economic zones gain even greater economic and political independence from 
the center? Could there be a violent power struggle after Deng Xiaopingls death? 
Will corruption paralyze economic reforms? Is further economic modernization 
possible without political change? No one knows the answers -- and those who 
pretend they do, have not learned the lesson of radical political changes in this 
century. All we can do is speculate. 
Let us envision three scenarios; one, in which China will experience further 
economic liberalization and gradual progress towards democracy; another, in 
which the country would sink into the chaos of a full-blown civil conflict sparked 
by regional diversities and people's discontent with political and civil repression; 
and third, a country in which a post-Deng "strong men" or power elite puts the 
brakes on economic and political reforms to re-centralize authority. 
Scenario 1: Market economy and socio-political liberalization 
Many people inside and outside China hope that the country can achieve what 
would be a unique development among the communist states of the 20th century: 
31 Segal, G. (1994): The Muddle Kingdom? China's Changing Shape. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3,43-58 
32 Lieberthal, K. (1995): A New China Strategy. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6,35-49 
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a smooth transition from command to market economy, a gradual liberalization 
of society and a peaceful transition to democracy. In this scenario the China of the 
21st century would be more open to the outside world, wealthier, and more 
regionally diverse. There would be more individual freedom, greater political 
participation and economic flexibility, but probably also more corruption and 
income disparities. 33 
In this political scenario land-use would be increasingly dominated by market 
mechanisms. Private owners would make the decisions about land-use -- not a 
central bureaucracy far away. The price of land would determine to a great extent 
for which purpose the land would be used. It is not difficult to predict that in this 
scenario private farmland in close neighborhood to large booming cities and 
towns would be quickly converted into suburbs and commercial sites. Few 
farmers prefer to cultivate their land when they can sell it and become million- 
aires. Land-use change around urban areas of Europe or Northern America was 
usually associated to the emergence of rather opulent wealth among the original 
land owners. 
The use of land in rural areas would very much depend on producer prices for 
agricultural products and, if they are introduced, state subsidies. Europe is a 
showcase of how quickly land use can change with consecutive waves of state 
subsidies and market conditions: the farmers plant whatever generates more 
income. For instance, changing food preferences (and various subsidies) have 
made oil crops in Europe often more profitable than roots and tubers. Hence, the 
soybean area harvested increased 50 times between 1961 and 1981 from 21,000 to 
1,331,000 ha, the rape seed area expanded almost 6 times and sunflower seed 
areas almost 5 times. The area for roots and tubers production, however, was 
reduced by 50% between 1961 and 1992 (from 8.9 to 4.2 million ha).34 
Bio-physical conditions, such as the quality of the soil, the amount of rainfall or 
the level and distribution of temperature are certainly not irrelevant for the land- 
use patterns of a market-oriented agriculture, but they are often less important than 
socio-economic incentives (and subsidies). Finland is a good example: the 
country's soils and climate is certainly not optimal for the production of rape 
seed. Yet even in this cold and rainy climate the country's farmers expanded the 
rape seed area between 1961 and 1992 by a factor of 12 -- from 6,000 to 73,000 ha. 
And they even managed to increase the area of sugar beet cultivation from 18,000 
to 32,000 ha. 
If China's agriculture moves towards a market system, consumer demand will 
primarily determine how the arable land is used. This is a clear lesson from 
Europe and Northern America. Thus, food preferences and other socio-economic 
conditions are not just interesting side aspects. They are major driving forces of 
land use. 
In conclusion, we can assume that in an "economic growth scenario" China's 
agricultural land use patterns would be rather fragmented, highly variable and 
regionally diverse, due to individual decision making of land owners and 
changing consumer demands. Much land would be transformed into urban areas 
33 Lieberthal, K. (1995): Governing China: From Revolution through Reform. New York (W.W. Norton) 
34 FA0 (1994): AGROSTAT. Rome (Electronic Data Base) 
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or industrial sites. The rapidly growing industrial economy would require a sig- 
nificant expansion of (road) infrastructure, which would not only cut through 
cultivated areas, but also open up previously remote areas to colonization or 
resource exploitation. Much more land than today would be needed as parks and 
recreation areas for the "exploding" urban population. 
Scenario 2: Chaos and conflict 
While most of the professional China observers seem to predict a more or less 
linear, continuous economic and political development for the country, far more 
radical and violent alternatives cannot be excluded. As Arthur Waldron has 
pointed out "substantial -- and not evolutionary or gradual -- changes are not 
only possible but likely".35 The biggest threat to China's economic and political 
stability comes from within the system: it is the contradiction between economic 
liberalization and ongoing political control. The situation is like a horse race in 
which the animal storms forward at the spurs of the jockey who simultaneously 
draws in the reins. It is hard to believe that China's still very small but growing 
middle class of successful managers, entrepreneurs, and professionals will much 
longer accept the top-down control of a communist bureaucracy. It is also hard to 
believe that the students and intellectuals can be kept quiet for all times. The 
economy needs smart managers who know the world -- how could they other- 
wise compete in international markets? But those who are sent abroad have seen 
individual and political freedom they will demand back home. 
Equally explosive might be the rapidly growing regional diversity which is 
also a result of China's economic success. How long will a powerful local politi- 
cian or economic leader accept interference from center which is a continental 
distance away? China's vast size has always been a threat to its unity, but it will 
be even greater as the provinces further drift apart in their economic per- 
formance. 
Finally, we have to realize that Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms have not only 
transformed the country economically, but also socially. The threat of famine and 
poverty had been greatly reduced; millions more Chinese have learned how to 
read and write; TV sets and radios have given peasants a glimpse of the world; 
and people, for the first time in communist China, could travel relatively unre- 
stricted. Every year, during the "Spring Festival" China's train stations are 
clogged for several days as millions of peasants are on their way to see friends or 
look for a (temporary) job in a city. There is a saying in Europe that "a serf 
becomes a freeman if he stayed in a town for a year and a day". In China, millions 
of peasants will go urban. It might not have been his intention, but Deng has 
triggered a "cultural revolution" with his reforms which could easily spark a real 
upheaval. Those who believe a civil revolution impossible in China, should think 
twice: no one had thought a few years ago that the disciplined East Germans 
would use crowbars and hammers to break down the "Berlin Wall" and that the 
Soviet flag would be lowered over the Kremlin. A civil revolution, however, 
could easily result in chaos and conflict. The ruling power elite might not grant 
35 Waldron, A. (1995): After Deng the Deluge. China's Next Leap Forward. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5, 
148-153 
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greater freedom and participation, but use the military to restore order. The 
protest might expand to the regions and get out of control. There might be diver- 
gent interests between political leaders of wealthy regions and the central govern- 
ment. It would not be the first time of civil war in China. 
What would all this mean to land use in China? We have some recent expe- 
rience with African countries that have drowned in political conflict and civil war, 
such as Ethiopia, Angola or Mozambique. Usually, these conflicts have caused a 
serious. decline of agriculture, followed by widespread food deficits and famine. 
Africa's food disasters during the last decades are almost all associated to war and 
civil conflict. In a long period of civil war farmers usually switch back to sub- 
sistence farming, since transport routes are unsafe and markets often inaccessible. 
Areas of market production fall fallow. Therefore, a paradox consequence of 
political conflict and agricultural decline can be the recovery of "natural" land. 
The most important land-use consequence of a civil conflict in China, however, 
would be the stagnation or even decline of industrial and urban land. Foreign 
investment in China, which is a growth engine of the economic success, would 
immediately go down if the country looses its stability. The ambitious plans for 
infrastructure expansion, however, could not be carried out without foreign 
assistance. 
In conclusion, if China would loose its current economic and political stability 
in a civil conflict, the country would remain more rural. Urban land use would 
grow much slower or even decline -- as recently arrived peasants would probably 
go back to their village. Agricultural land use would be more affected by agro- 
climatic conditions than by market demand. The intensity of cultivation would 
decline, as modern inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticide and seeds of high yielding 
varieties would become scarce during the economic crisis. 
Scenario 3: Restoration of central authority and planning 
If there is one thing every Chinese ruler is aware of then it is the threat to the 
country's unity. China is the most enduring human civilization, because when- 
ever the country was in danger of being split up the center managed (sometimes 
after many decades) to re-centralize authority. And whatever went wrong with 
communism in China, one achievement is undisputed: it helped to reestablish and 
maintain the country's unity. China's leaders have not forgotten the decade of 
civil war in the 1920s, when China was in danger to fall apart as civil warlords 
fought for power after the Manchu empire ~o l lapsed .~~  
One obvious possible scenario for China, therefore, is that the leaders might 
put on the brakes and re-centralize the power structure. Most likely this would 
include a backslash to a centrally planned, Soviet-style command economy.37 And 
one of the first decisions of a new "strong-man" or authoritarian power elite 
would be to seriously restrict mobility. The old guard of communists from the 
"Great March always hated the urban society, because they (correctly) suspected 
it ideologically unreliable. The "Cultural Revolution" promoted by a radical 
fraction around Mao's wife, was not only a campaign against intellectuals, it was 
36 Harland, B. (1993): For a Strong China. In: Foreign Affairs, No. 94,48-52 
37 Hornik, R. (1995): Bursting China's BubbIe. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3,28-42 
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an attempt to weaken the urban areas. De-urbanization is one of the core ideas of 
radical communism -- from China to Cambodia and Russia to Cuba. 
The land-use consequences of a return to central authority and communist eco- 
nomy would probably be a slow down of urbanization -- partly due to stricter 
control of mobility, partly due to a slow down of urban economic growth. With a 
re-establishment of central planning land cultivation would become more homo- 
genous. In the current system of family farming the peasants have some incen- 
tives to increase productivity: they can use part of their production to generate 
private profits, either by selling it on urban markets or to state agencies. Hence, 
the farmers will try to optimize land cultivation so that it meets the specific bio- 
physical, climatic and hydrological conditions. This is not necessary and possible 
with centralized planning, where land use is determined by a general economic 
scheme. 
3. Discussion 
Of all anthropogenic factors that might affect future land use change in China 
the increase of population is probably the most predictable. Not much can be 
done to prevent a significant population increase. Fertility is already down to a 
West European level and a massive increase of mortality is not in sight. On the 
contrary, it is quite likely that mortality will further decline with economic 
development. There is also a clear potential for an increase in fertility. China was 
so successful with its "one child policy", that the government might have to relax 
restrictions to cool down widespread frustration with the measure.38 Of course, no 
one can predict fertility for the middle of the next century, but most demogra- 
phers would be very surprised if the Total Fertility Rate were lower than 2 and 
much higher than 2.5 children.39 Depending on mortality assumptions this would 
be equivalent to a population increase of at least 400 million. To curb this growth 
rather drastic (if not coercive) measures would be necessary in order to reduce 
average fertility to about 1.5 children per woman. But even then China's popula- 
tion would grow for the next two or three decades and only then begin to decline 
to its current size. 
Urbanization seems to be a different story. There are various measures which 
can affect the speed and extent of an urbanization process. The mobility of a 
population can be controlled and restricted by both direct and indirect measures. 
One important factor is the relation of agricultural to non-agricultural income; but 
one can also impose legal restrictions, or reduce the availability of cheap transpor- 
tation and urban housing. The location of industrial sites also affects the urbaniza- 
tion process. All these means of intervention, however, only work in the planned 
economy of an authoritarian state. Not much can be done to control or even pre- 
vent rural-urban migration and city growth in a liberal society and a market 
economy. As China moves into this direction the country will experience much 
38 Feeney, G. / Wang, F. (1993): Parity progression and birth intervals in China: The influence of policy in 
hastening fertility decline. In: Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 1,61-101 
39 Feeney, G. / Jingyuan Yu (1987): Period parity progression measures of fertility in China. In: Population 
Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1,77-102 
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the same population re-distribution as is typical for all industrialized democra- 
cies. 
But what about the economic trends? Can we just extrapolate China's present 
economic growth rates into the future? For all its impressive industrial growth in 
recent years, China is still a poor and underdeveloped country. Even if we believe 
the economic growth statistics cited above (which, of course we do only to a 
certain extent), there is reason to suspect that the boom will slow down. As Paul 
Krugman has outlined in his review of recent economic research on the Pacific 
Rim, the popular enthusiasm about Asia's economic miracle "deserves some cold 
water thrown on it".40 There is evidence that economic growth in Asia is running 
primarily on massive increases of inputs like capital and labor, rather than by 
gains in effi~iency.~' Due to the steep fertility decline in past decades, China, at the 
moment, has a huge labor force of healthy well educated adults in their 30s, who 
have few children and few elderly to take care of. The proportion of population in 
active to non-active age is extremely favorable in China. The economic liberaliza- 
tion also brought much capital into the country and the privileged access to the 
American market boosted demand. China became one of the largest importers for 
the US. But all these are one-time advantages. In a few decades the large genera- 
tion of Chinese "Baby Boomers" (from before the steep fertility decline) will be in 
their 60s and 70s and will have to be supported by their few children (of the "one 
child policy'' generation) (see Figure 12). 
Moreover, capital investment works best in the initial phase of economic 
growth: a construction brigade with shovels will gain a huge increase of output 
when given a bulldozer; however a more advanced construction company with 50 
bulldozers will produce only slightly more when given one more machine. Most 
economic indicators that show very high economic growth for China start in 1978, 
when the country was economically broke and in the firm grip of a Stalinist com- 
mand economy. Indices based on more recent years are less impressive. In other 
words, there is a clear level effect in China's spectacular economic growth rates. It 
will take a long time, before China's economy is driven by real advances in (labor 
and technological) efficiency -- that is increases of output per unit of input. China's 
spectacular economic growth will probably run into diminishing returns. 
The linear economic growth scenario also does not take into account environ- 
mental restrictions and side effects. For instance unlike the USA, China -- in the 
long run -- cannot afford to base its economy exclusively on road transport and 
make the excessive use of private cars a major growth engine of its industry. Not 
to speak about CO, emissions, there is simply not enough space. People tend to 
forget that China is extremely densely populated. For instance, Henan, Shandong, 
and Jiangsu have a combined total population of 237 million, which is only a little 
less than the total population of the United States of America; their population 
density, however, ranges from 512 to 654 people per km2 -- up to 24 times higher 
than the average US population density of 27.14 of the 30 Chinese provinces have 
a (much) higher population density than Germany. 
40 Krugrnan, P. (1994): The Myth of Asia's Miracle. In: Foreign Affairs, Vo1.73, No. 6, 62-78 
41 Lau, L. / Jong-I1 Kim (1994): The Sources of Growth of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries. In: 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 
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Figure 12: China's Population by Age and Sex, 1970, 1995 and 2050 
Source: UN Population Division (1 995): Population Assessments and Projections, 1994 Edition (from DemoGraphics '94) 
If China would have the same per capita car-related land consumption as the 
US or Europe, much of the valuable arable land would have to be converted to 
roads, highways, parking lots, and car production sites. In the long run, China's 
eastern provinces do not have the option of a car-based society such as the United 
States; they will need efficient mass transport to save valuable land. In the short 
run, however, cars and commercial road transport will significantly change land- 
use patterns in China. 
How certain can we be, that land-use related lifestyles will change in China? 
Quite certain, if there is (at least a slight) growth in mass income! Despite cultural 
differences people all over the world seem to have an astounding array of shared 
consumption needs: from Indonesia to Germany and China to the United States 
people, for instance, immediately begin to change their diet when a broader range 
of food becomes available and when they can afford it. They begin to eat more 
meat and sugar, but also more vegetables, fruits and stimulants (coffee, tea, beer). 
Their diet becomes less monotonous. China has already switched from the rice 
and noodle diets of Mao's time to a more varied cuisine. Western style food is 
very popular among the growing urban middle class. If you want to see a really 
crowded MacDonald's the one behind Tianamen Square is a good choice. 
In this context it might be interesting to know that the McDonald's restaurant 
on Moscow's Pushkin Square has served 80 million customers (!) since it was 
opened in 1990.42 (It was impossible to get equivalent data for the MacDonald's 
restaurants in Beijing). Unfortunately, the impact of this astounding fact is easily 
misunderstood. People usually consider it just a triumph of "western capitalism". 
But the socio-cultural side of this success is far more important. It indicates a globali- 
zation of taste and lifestyles -- which is the basis of worldwide marketing of "ham- 
burgers", "Coca Cola", rock-music CDs, videos, movies, or computer games. If we 
like it or not, what MacDonald's is doing in Beijing (or Moscow, Jakarta, New 
Delhi, or Paris) is not just selling squashy buns with minced meet, but educating 
(or brainwashing) the world about taste. Tastes, especially food preferences, 
which once were an element of ethnic identity, will gradually become the result of 
marketing techniques from multi-national corporations. This will also affect 
China, if the country remains open to the outside world. 
Who ever has traveled the developing world knows that motorbikes and cars 
have a very high consumption priority not only in Los Angeles or Rome, but also 
among peasants emerging from poverty. The Honda revolution in Asia is a clear 
indication of this need. Millions of poor farmers in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines have saved all their money to get a motorbike for the eldest 
son. The automotive revolution will spread to all parts of the world as soon as 
economic conditions allow it -- no matter what green activists might grumble 
about. We better face what seems to be a basic human need and make sure that the 
most advanced technology is available to minimize energy consumption and 
pollution when Asia's multi-billion population will hit the road. In the long run, 
China will need mass transport to save its land from the concrete of roads (and 
the world from CO, emissions). But for the next one or two decades we will see an 
42 "Borscht and Blini to Go. From Russian Capitalists, an Answer to McDonald's". In: The New York Times, 
August 9,1995, p. 1 (Vol. CXLIV, No. 50148). 
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explosion of motorbikes and cars -- especially in China, and much land will be 
used for roads and highways. 
Finally, what are our chances to predict China's political system or at least to 
design useful scenarios? Very poor, I suspect! One could easily fill a whole book 
from cover to back withfalse predictions and absurdly gross misinterpretation on 
China (and, I am afraid, some arguments and data in this paper might be among 
them). The reason for poor predictions is an unusual lack of valid information. 
Data Validity 
When Lord Boyd-Orr, former head of the UN Food and Agricultural Organiza- 
tion visited China he was obviously pleased with what he saw and what the 
battalion of statistical number crunchers and analysts at his Rome headquarters 
had told him about the country. He announced that Chinas peasants had raised 
their crop yields to British levels and ended the traditional famine cycle. 
"Speaking in 1959, he concluded, 'China has one-quarter of the world's popula- 
tion but seems capable of feeding it well'. "43 Not quite -- as we know today. 
While the UN director was lecturing his audience on China's agricultural success, 
some 23 million or more peasants were dying in the largest famine ever recorded. 
Such colossal failure to see the truth, however, was not the privilege of a high 
rank official who was a bit detached from reality. Even hard-core China watchers, 
careful scientists and nosy journalists who pretended to know the country like 
their pocket, missed the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward. In fact, there is 
evidence that Mao himself didn't know what was going on. Why is it so difficult 
to understand Chna? 
Not many countries have a more advanced system of institutionalized misinfor- 
mation. The dynastic bureaucracy had always been a powerful buffer and selec- 
tive filter between the real world and the court of the emperor. That didn't change 
much under the communist government. For the first few years after the 
founding of the People's Republic of China there was almost no nationwide 
collection of statistical data -- the only exception was the 1953 population census. 
When the State Statistical Bureau was established in late 1952 to monitor the First 
5 Year-Plan period (from 1952 - 1957) the situation temporarily improved. By the 
end of 1957 a few economic and demographic data (from the census) were 
published and accessible to  foreigner^."^ But then the statistical system began to 
disintegrate and fell under strict political control for more than two decades. 
Party cadres, instead of statisticians collected data and almost everything was 
restricted for foreigners. Economy statistics were used for allocation of resources, 
income, privileges and power. They were manipulated to "show success" and 
fulfillment of the plan. There was gross exaggeration of production statistics -- 
which contributed to the widespread (national and international) unawareness of 
disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward. A short period of recovery in 
the early 1960's was ended by the Cultural Revolution which began in 1966. 
43 Cited from: Kristof, N.D. / Wudunn, S. (1994): China Wakes. The struggle for the soul of a rising power. 
New York (Vintage), p.453 
44 It was a small booklet on "Ten Great Years: Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the 
People's Republic of China" 
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Statisticians became politically suspect, as the fanatical Red Guards roamed the 
streets and harassed, attacked, deported or killed thousands of intellectuals. After 
Mao's death and the imprisonment of the "gang of four" statistical work in China 
slowly recovered. But only since 1984, when a new statistical law took effect, the 
People's Republic of China has a central statistical system that operates according 
to western standards of objectivity. This we should keep in mind, whenever we 
analyze those spectacular time series of economic and social progress in China. 
Even today there are statistical data on China which are questionable or not 
accessible to foreigners. A good example are land use / land cover data: If one 
would believe official re-forestation statistics from China one would expect a 
country covered by forest and woodland. Table 2, for instance, indicates that the 
largest kind of land use change in China between 1949 and 1990 was the expansion 
of forest -- a diagnosis not shared by those who have seen the country. It is also 
impossible for foreigners to get any county-level information other than simple 
population statistics. There is one statistical data set, however, which is usually 
considered of good quality and which is published and accessible in great detail: 
the 1990 population census of the People's Republic of China. 
Conclusion 
Five anthropogenic factors have been identified as major driving forces of land 
use change in China: (1) population growth, (2) urbanization, (3) industrialization, 
(4) changes in lifestyle and (food) consumption, (5) (future) political and economic 
arrangements and institutions. A first set of empirical data have been collected 
and analyzed to better understand the current trends of demographic and socio- 
economic changes in China that will affect future land-use. Further data collection 
and analysis is necessary. Based on the currently available data we have to 
assume that rural-urban migration and the growth of cities and (industrial) infra- 
structures will be the dominant factor of land use change in the Eastern provinces 
of China. 
Appendix 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Inner Mongolia 
Liaoning 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Henan 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Hainan 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Tibet 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
Total 
Sown Area 
(in 1000 Ha) 
565.3 
565.7 
8,676.7 
3,999.0 
4,868.3 
3,630.0 
4,050.7 
8,647.2 
558.1 
8,032.3 
3,926.2 
8,265.1 
2,733.3 
5,721 .O 
10,743.5 
12,068.0 
7,125.5 
7,653.9 
5,145.6 
5,385.2 
884.4 
12,664.2 
3,971.9 
4,770.0 
215.0 
4,790.2 
3,638.7 
548.2 
905.0 
2,992.7 
Rice 
(in %) 
4.7 31.4 38.6 2.0 1.2 2.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8 0.0 9.2 
7.4 24.4 27.6 13.9 0.7 4.3 1.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 11.7 0.0 5.1 
1.5 29.1 24.5 9.5 4.9 6.4 6.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.0 0.0 8.4 
0.2 25.6 16.3 12.1 7.3 8.5 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.3 3.3 0.0 6.1 
1.5 24.4 15.7 16.2 5.4 10.3 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.1 1.7 0.0 1.2 
13.3 5.0 39.0 9.6 2.8 3.9 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.7 8.1 0.0 11.6 
10.6 2.8 50.3 15.0 2.2 3.8 0.0 0.1 1.1 1 .O 4.6 0.0 1.8 
8.5 15.5 20.5 35.5 2.7 1.8 0.0 0.8 3.3 1 .O 3.0 0.0 0.4 
38.7 13.6 1.5 2.1 0.0 13.2 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 13.9 0.0 2.3 
28.4 28.4 5.9 5.2 2.5 7.4 6.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.8 0.2 1.6 
54.4 6.3 1.0 3.3 3.7 6.0 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.0 7.2 3.7 5.6 
26.3 25.2 5.6 7.5 6.9 12.1 4.3 1 .O 0.1 0.3 3.8 1.5 1 .O 
50.6 3.1 1 .O 4.2 11.8 4.2 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.5 12.1 4.8 16.8 
50.1 1.3 0.3 4.2 2.5 14.7 2.6 0.2 0.8 0.8 6.5 1 .O 2.4 
1 .O 38.7 22.7 5.8 6.1 7.3 7.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 5.9 0.0 7.3 
3.7 40.1 16.2 6.3 6.0 8.9 8.1 0.6 0.0 1.9 4.0 0.2 2.3 
33.4 17.8 5.1 4.4 5.4 10.3 6.8 0.4 0.2 1.4 7.1 1.4 2.3 
52.6 2.3 1.7 3.5 4.7 9.1 2.2 0.2 0.4 1.8 5.6 1.9 3.3 
51.1 0.8 1 .O 2.4 8.8 6.8 0.0 0.1 4.9 1 .O 13.7 0.8 13.3 
44.9 0.3 9.8 5.3 5.0 4.4 0.1 0.3 7.4 1 .O 7.4 0.5 5.2 
44.1 0.0 1.6 1.6 19.0 5.5 0.0 0.1 9.9 0.1 9.4 0.8 2.4 
24.0 18.5 13.5 4.2 15.0 7.0 1 .O 0.4 0.3 1.4 6.0 0.9 2.1 
18.0 13.9 15.2 5.3 11.5 9.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 8.3 6.5 1.2 0.9 
19.5 12.8 19.6 9.9 6.2 2.5 0.0 0.1 3.2 10.2 4.0 3.4 2.3 
0.5 20.3 1.3 8.6 0.6 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
3.4 34.3 20.9 8.7 7.5 6.3 1.9 0.1 0.1 1.6 3.2 0.6 10.0 
0.2 38.6 8.5 9.1 8.2 8.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.7 2.1 0.0 6.0 
0.0 38.3 0.0 11.9 6.7 23.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.1 
6.9 34.6 8.4 12.1 4.9 10.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 2.7 0.0 3.5 
2.3 36.3 13.3 2.4 0.3 7.8 20.3 0.1 2.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 4.5 
Corn 
(in %) 
Wheat 
(in %) 
Soybeans 
(in %) 
Tubers 
(in%) 
Oil Crops 
(in%) 
Cotton 
(in%) 
Hemp 
(in%) 
Sugar 
(in%) 
Tobacco 
(in %) 
Vegetables 
(in %) 
Tea 
(in %) 
Orchards 
(in %) 
Year 
1978 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
150,104 34,421 29,183 19,961 1 1,796 6,222 4,867 751 879 784 3,331 1,048 1,657 
146,379 33,879 29,228 20,353 10,153 7,928 4,920 666 922 51 2 3,163 1,041 1,783 
143,993 33,137 29,050 18,824 9,402 8,390 6,077 389 1,198 768 4,102 1,105 2,015 
144,221 33,179 29,577 18,537 8,988 8,678 6,923 486 1,230 897 4,320 1,077 2,219 
143,626 32,070 29,218 17,694 8,572 11,800 5,141 1,231 1,525 1,313 4,753 1,045 2,736 
144,204 32,266 29,616 19,124 8,685 11,414 4,306 762 1,470 1,125 5,304 1,024 3,672 
144,957 32,193 28,798 20,212 8,867 11,180 4,844 967 1,357 1,128 5,572 1,044 4,508 
144,869 31,987 28,785 19,692 9,054 10,619 5,535 735 1,669 1,555 6,032 1,056 5,066 
146,554 32,700 29,841 20,353 9,097 10,504 5,203 563 1,529 1,798 6,290 1,065 5,372 
148,362 33,064 30,753 21,401 9,121 10,900 5,588 495 1,679 1,593 6,338 1,061 5,179 
149,586 32,590 30,948 21,574 9,078 11,530 6.538 453 1,947 1,804 6.546 1,060 5.31 8 
149,007 32,090 30,496 21,044 8,983 9,057 11,489 6,835 434 1,906 2,093 7,031 1,084 5,818 
147,741 30,355 30,235 20,694 12,377 9,220 11,142 4,985 420 1,687 2,089 8,084 1,171 6,432 
Sugar Tubers 
Total 
Sown Area Wheat Rice Oil Crops Tobacco Corn Vegetables Tea Cotton Soybeans Orchards Hemp 
